We study the effect of the addition of a futures market, in which contracts maturing in the last period of the life of the asset can be traded. Our experiment has two treatments, one in which a spot market operates on its own, and a second treatment in which a spot and futures market are active simultaneously. We find that the futures market reduces spot market mispricing among a trader population prone to bubbles, while having no effect on mispricing in a group not prone to it. Thus, overall, futures markets aid price discovery in the spot market, although the futures markets themselves exhibit considerable overpricing. Individuals with higher cognitive reflection test (CRT) scores achieve greater earnings, as they tend to sell in the overpriced futures market, while traders with lower CRT score make purchases in the futures market. We also consider the predictive power of an enhanced CRT measure (ECRT), which weights two types of incorrect answers differently.
Introduction
Futures markets are thought to aid in the effective functioning of asset markets. For instance, Cox [1976] argues that the existence of futures markets may attract additional traders to participate in spot markets. Futures prices provide an aggregated measure of traders' expectations about prospective spot prices. Indeed, as Grossman [1977] points out, in an imperfect market, it is impossible for a spot market itself to perfectly incorporate all information about the future such as traders' expectation about future prices. The futures market helps harmonize beliefs about future prices, which may in turn help price discovery in the spot market.
Empirically, how well futures markets aid price discovery may be reflected by the leadlag relationship between spot and futures markets. Garbade and Silber [1983] , estimate that about 75 percent of new information [is] incorporated in futures prices first. Chan [1992] , among others, reports that futures market price indices tend to lead their counterpart spot indices 1 . Moreover, Antoniou and Holmes [1995] suggest that the introduction of futures for the FTSE-100 index has improved the functioning of the spot market.
The effects of futures markets on spot market price discovery have also been studied in controlled laboratory environments. In markets for short-lived (2-or 3-period) assets, it has been shown that the existence of a futures market significantly fosters information transmission among traders and thereby increases the convergence rate of prices to the rational expectations equilibrium level in the spot market (Forsythe et al. [1982] ; Friedman et al. [1984] ). This suggests that a futures market creates common rational expectations about future prices for traders. This in turn leads spot markets to converge to rational expectations price levels.
In the paradigm of Smith et al. [1988] , asset prices in experimental asset markets tend to exhibit a pattern of bubbles and crashes (see Palan [2013] for a recent overview) in the absence of futures markets. In this setting, the asset has a relatively long life, typically 15 periods. Each unit of the asset pays a per-unit dividend at the end of each period.
The dividend distribution and process are common knowledge. Since the only source of intrinsic value for the asset is the dividends and the time horizon is finite, the fundamental value at any point in time can be calculated. The fundamental value declines over time by the amount of the expected per-period dividend, as the remaining number of dividend payments declines. However, instead of tracking fundamental values, market prices typically greatly exceed fundamental values for a prolonged period of time and then rapidly drop to fundamental value as the end of life of the asset approaches.
Will the presence of a futures market aid price discovery of long-lived asset traded in spot market? Porter and Smith [1995] consider the effects of the inclusion of a market for futures contracts maturing half-way through the life of the asset, namely in period eight of a 15-period horizon. They find that it exerts at best a very modest dampening effect on price bubbles. Noussair and Tucker [2006] find that the addition of a complete set of futures markets, one maturing in every period, serves to eliminate spot market price bubbles.
However, they also observe widespread mispricing in the futures markets themselves. The research question we ask in this paper is how effective one futures market, for contracts maturing in the final period of the asset's life, is in reducing price bubbles. We conjecture that the futures market maturing in the last period might be especially important in improving price discovery because it encourages backward reasoning about the price path from the end of the life of the asset to the present. It also helps traders to form common expectations about futures prices.
Our experiment has two treatments, one in which a spot market operates on its own, and a second treatment in which a spot and futures market are active simultaneously. The experiment is conducted in two different locations: at Tilburg University in the Netherlands, and at University of Waikato in New Zealand. We conduct 25 sessions, of which 13 took place in New Zealand. A cognitive reflection test [Frederick, 2005] , measuring ability/willingness to reflect on a logical problem, is administered to all participants in both locations before the market was introduced to them.
We obtain the following results. In the Waikato sample, futures markets reduce bubble magnitudes and overall mispricing significantly. In the Tilburg sample, characterized by considerably smaller bubbles when no futures market is present, the futures market does not affect mispricing. The average cognitive reflection test (CRT) score of a trader cohort is significantly negatively correlated with the magnitude of mispricing. This is especially true for baseline treatments. Individually, higher CRT scores are associated with greater earnings. In the futures markets, traders with relatively low CRT scores tend to make purchases at prices greater than the rational expectations equilibrium level. Traders with relatively high CRT scores tend to make sales, which are highly profitable, in these overpriced futures markets. The main conclusion of our study is that one futures market, for contracts maturing in the last period of the life of the asset, reduces mispricing among a population prone to bubbles, while having no effect on mispricing in a group not prone to them. Thus, overall, futures markets aid price discovery.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the experimental design and procedures. Section 3 presents results from the experiment, and Section 4 concludes.
Experimental Design and Procedures

The Baseline Treatment
In the sessions of the Baseline treatment, participants can trade an asset with a life of 15 periods. At the end of each period, the asset pays a dividend that is independently drawn in each period from a four-point distribution in which each unit of asset pays a dividend of 0, 8, 28, and 60 francs (experimental currency used for trade) with equal probability. To rule out any effect of the arrival sequence of dividend stream on asset prices, we use computer to generate a sequence of dividend payments and the same sequence was used for all sessions.
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Dividends are the only source of value for the asset. The fundamental value of each unit of asset during period t equals the expected future dividend stream to be received, which is 24 * (16 − t) francs.
At the beginning of the experiment, participants are endowed with 3,600 francs as well as 10 units of asset. Therefore, the cash to asset ratio at the opening of the market is equal to one (= 3600 24 * 15 * 10 ). In all treatments, short selling and borrowing cash for purchases is not allowed. The exchange rate in our experiment is either 460 francs = 1 euro or 275 francs = 1 NZ dollar, depending on the location. The continuous double auction market is computerized by using z-Tree [Fischbacher, 2007] .
Futures Market Treatment
In the Futures treatment, a futures market is operating in addition to the spot market.
Futures contracts are realized in period 15. The difference between the two markets is that the actual trade does not take place immediately in the futures market, whereas it does in the spot market. In other words, a trader who makes a contract in the futures market to buy (sell) a unit of asset is committed to buy (sell) the unit at the beginning of the fifteenth period. If a trader had committed to sell a unit of the asset in the futures market, she continued to receive the dividends on the unit until the trade took effect. The buyer who had committed to buy this unit would only receive a one time dividend payment at the end of the fifteenth period given that they do not sell the unit in the last period. Therefore, the rational expectations equilibrium price in the futures market equals 24 francs. In our experiment, the futures market opens 3 minutes prior to the opening of the spot market.
The futures market remains open until the end of spot market period 14.
Due to the presence of the futures market and restriction of no short selling, there could be a difference between what we call the "available stock" and the "actual stock" of asset. These two would be different if an agent makes commitments in the futures market. The available stock for sale in the futures market is the sum of the actual stock in an agent's inventory plus the net amount contracted in the futures market, which (the latter) is the difference between contracted purchases minus contracted sales in the futures markets. The available stock for sale in the spot market never exceeds the actual stock because the contracted purchase only enters one's inventory at the beginning of the last period. All these constraints guarantee that all the commitments made in the futures market are executable when the time comes. In addition, those assets that have been already committed to sell in the futures market cannot be sold again in the spot market. All the above mentioned constraints are automatically implemented or calculated by the computer and are clearly explained in detail to the participants 2 .
Procedures
A total of 25 sessions were conducted between June 2013 and February 2014. Of these, 13 sessions (7 baseline sessions and 6 treatment sessions) were run at the Waikato Experimental Economics Laboratory at the University of Waikato in New Zealand and 12 sessions (6 baseline sessions and 6 treatment sessions) were conducted at the CentERlab at Tilburg University in the Netherlands. The experimenters strictly followed the same procedures in all sessions.
There were 9 traders participating in most sessions, with a few sessions with less people due to absenteeism. Participants were university students from a variety of majors who had no previous experience on asset market experiments. Upon arrival, subjects were free to choose a computer desk to use for the session.
A session proceeded as follows. (1 
Results
Overall Results
The time series of average transaction prices for both the spot market and the futures market are plotted in Figure 1 . The horizontal axis indicates the period and the vertical axis shows the average transaction price. In the Baseline treatment, where no futures market is available, the pooled average transaction prices are above fundamental value from period 6 onward. In comparison, the pooled average transaction prices in the spot market of the Futures treatment (denoted as Pooled Avg Spot) track the fundamental value much more closely. Moreover, the average transaction prices in the pooled futures spot market are lower than the Baseline treatment in every period. In the futures market, the average transaction prices are initially greater than the rational expectations equilibrium price and gradually converge to that price towards the end of the market. The average transaction prices in the Baseline treatment initially start at similar values in the two locations. However, from period 2 on, the prices in NZ are above those in NL and above the fundamental value from period 5 onward. In comparison, the average transaction prices in NL converge towards the fundamental value till period 7 upon which they follow the fundamental value closely from then onwards. In contrast, the average price paths in both the futures and spot markets are very similar in the Futures treatment between the two locations.
The following subsections are organized as follows. We first introduce the bubble measures we employ in this study. We then report on the the effect of the existence of a futures market on spot market behavior in each of the two data collection locations. Lastly, we study the relationship between CRT scores and market, as well as individual, outcomes. 
Bubble Measures
The three measures we use to compare bubble magnitudes in this are Relative Absolute Deviation (RAD), Relative Deviation (RD), and Turnover 3 .
RAD is a measure of absolute difference between price and fundamental value, while RD is a measure of the difference between the price level and fundamental value [Stöckl et al., 2010] . RAD measures how closely prices track fundamental value, while RD indicates whether on average prices are above (RD>0) or below (RD<0) fundamental value.
Turnover (Van Boening et al. [1993] ) is the total number of transactions over the life 3 RAD is defined as
, where p denotes period and T stands for the total number of periods. F V t is the fundamental value in period t and the term P t denotes the (volume-weighted) average price. Since our trading rules did not allow batch orders, P t , for the purpose of this paper, boils down to the average price in period t. The measure RD is the same as RAD, except that the numerator does not include the absolute value operator. Specifically, RD is expressed as
Turnover is a normalized measure of the amount of trading activity over the course of the asset life, which is defined as T urnover = (Σ t q t )/T SU , where q t is the quantity of units of the asset exchanged in period t and TSU is equal to the total stock of units (in our case, it is 90 units).
of the asset divided by the total stock of units in the market. A high Turnover indicates a high volume of trade, which in experimental markets of the type studied here, is typically associated with mispricing possibly due to either heterogeneous expectations or errors in decision making which prompts trade. A Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test, for the bubble measure RD, confirms this observation with p-value lower than 5%. Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The summary of the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test results presented in Table 2 confirms these observations of the NL data as none of the p-values are critical. These results imply that there is no significant effect of the presence of a futures market on spot market prices in general within the NL sample. However, this is predominantly due to the absence of a bubble in the NL baseline data and thus there is no room for improvement in reducing mispricing 4 .
The New Zealand Sessions
Alternatively, we find that the presence of a futures market does not induce price bubbles in environments that are not prone to bubble formation. 
Analysis of the Pooled Data
For the pooled data from both locations (25 sessions), a Mann-Whitney-test, also reported in Table 2 , indicates that the futures market has a borderline significant attenuating effect on asset price bubbles, with RD being significantly lower in the Futures treatment (p-value=0.0818). In addition, turnover is also significantly lower in Futures than that in the Baseline (p-value=0.0033), suggesting that the futures market does indeed help induce common expectations about future prices. We therefore conclude that a futures market, for contracts maturing in the last period of the life of the asset, reduces mispricing among a population prone to bubbles, while having no effect on mispricing in a group not prone to bubbles. It has an attenuating effect on asset price bubbles overall.
The Role of CRT
In this section, we study the relationship between average CRT among traders in a session and pricing accuracy, as well as between CRT and profit at the individual level. The average CRT score in a trader cohort may be related to accurate pricing because agents who are more willing to or capable of think hard on logical problems may also be less prone to decision errors. 5 Furthermore, if those individuals with higher CRT scores make fewer errors, then CRT scores and earnings would have a positive correlation 6 .
The CRT questions are designed in such a way that there exists an intuitive and spontaneous wrong answer for each of them. In calculating the CRT score, each correct answer earns one point and all incorrect answers earn zero points. Therefore, the possible distribution of scores ranges from 0 to 3.
The Enhanced CRT (ECRT)
In the conventional calculation of CRT, all incorrect answers count zero towards the overall score regardless of the type of error. Incorrect answers may be divided into two categories, (a) an unique intuitive but spontaneous answer that indicates the ability to In this paper, we propose a new CRT measure called enhanced CRT (ECRT) 8 It punishes errors of type (a) more severely than those of type (b). It is meant to provide a measure that places more weight on those who can be tricked because they answer questions impulsively.
Errors of type (a) count -1 toward the overall CRT score while errors of type (b) count 0.
6 The CRT questionnaire is presented in the Appendix. 7 The correct answers to the three CRT questions are (5,5, and 47) while the intuitive/spontaneous incorrect answers are (10,100, and 24) 8 We have also constructed a measure called ECRT2 which punishes type (b) errors more strongly than those of type (a). Type (a) errors count -1 while type (b) errors count 0 toward an individual's overall score. Therefore, the possible range of ECRT2 scores is from -3 to 3. In the following analysis, we report both conventional CRT as well as ECRT. The range of possible total ECRT scores on the three question task is from -3 to 3. The average ECRT score over all 25 sessions is 0.33 while the conventional CRT average is 1.51.
About 39% of agents gave at least one answer that is a mistake of type (a). In addition, in our analysis, we consider a third modified measure of conventional CRT, i.e. the number of subjects with CRT=0 (hereafter called "zeros") in which a subject answers all questions incorrectly irrespective of the type of incorrect answer.
An overview of (E)CRT measures as per each location is provided in Table 3 . Subjects' level of sophistication in NL and NZ seems to be quite different. Specifically, for the measure zeros, there are 20% of subjects who have CRT=0. This value is almost doubled in NZ: 36% of subjects failed to give any correct answer. For the measure ECRT, 24% of subjects have ECRT<0 in NL, whereas in NZ, 50% of subjects have ECRT<0. Note: CRT: average CRT score in a session. Zeros: Number of agents with CRT=0. The p-values are in parenthesis. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
CRT and Market Behavior
for relatively sophisticated traders to speculate and to take advantage of those who are less sophisticated. This possibility is explored in the next subsection.
Moreover, we find that the number of subjects with CRT=0 (or ECRT ≤ 0) in a session is a better predictor of pricing accuracy than the average CRT score of the group 9 . The correlation coefficient between the number of zeros and the RAD is typically more significant and stronger in magnitude than those between average CRT and the RAD. In addition, for the pooled data from all sessions, the more subjects with CRT=0 in a session, the more prices deviate from the FV and the more volatile the prices are.
The Relationship between (E)CRT and Profit at Individual Level
The average prices in the futures markets are approximately five times the rational expectation price at the outset of the market. This provides an opportunity for more sophisticated traders to take advantage of the less sophisticated by selling futures contracts to them at excessively high prices.
Using the CRT and ECRT score as proxies for trader sophistication, we can test for whether this occurred in our markets. We analyze the relationship between an individual's market is calculated as the sum of profit from selling and profit from purchasing 11 . As can be seen in Figure 7 , our data suggest a strong and a significant (p-value = 0.0000 for both CRT and ECRT) correlation between an individual's relative (E)CRT score and her profit from trading in the futures market.
We also investigate the relationship between the (E)CRT score and total overall earnings at the end of each session. This reflects profits earned in the spot market, and where applicable, the futures market as well. Overall, we find that individuals with relatively higher (E)CRT scores earn greater overall profit (Spearman's rho = 0.4729, p-value = 0.0000 for ECRT), see Figure 8 , in which the vertical axis reports the total profit of individuals and the horizontal axis is the relative (E)CRT score. Figure 9 . Clearly, the relationship between (E)CRT score and profit is steeper in the Futures treatment. This result suggests that environments that are more demanding and complex, such as our Futures treatment, are more conducive to sophisticated traders earning more at the expense of the less sophisticated.
The (E)CRT Scores and Trading Behaviors in the Futures Market
Here, we consider how the behavior of low-and high-CRT scoring individuals differs in the futures market. Consider an individual who falls prey to the illusion that he makes a profit whenever he makes a purchase at a lower price than that at which he makes a sale.
This individual might in period 1, for example, make a purchase in the futures market for 200 francs and a sale in the spot market for 300 francs, believing that he is making a profit of 100. However, because the fundamental value is 360 and the rational expectations price in the futures market is 24, the individual is actually losing money in both markets. This trader myopically considers market prices without taking into account the timing of the transfer of the asset, which is a crucial determinant of the asset's value.
We might expect those with relatively low CRT and ECRT scores to be net buyers (total purchases minus total sales) in the futures market. Table 5 summarizes our findings. For both ECRT and CRT measures, we find that the more sophisticated a subject is, the less the quantity she buys in the futures market. The net amount of assets bought is significantly negatively correlated with (E)CRT scores at individual level. The ECRT score introduced Note: There are 97 subjects in this analysis, excluding 8 subjects who never participated in the futures market. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
in this paper is more strongly correlated with this type of decision error than the traditional CRT score.
Conclusion
The prevalence of price bubbles and crashes in experimental asset markets under the paradigm of Smith et al. [1988] has been well documented. We consider the effect of establishing a futures market for contracts to be realized in the last period of the life of the asset. The futures market might serve to fix expectations of spot prices in the last period and thereby dampen speculation in the spot market. Furthermore, it may direct the attention of agents to the last period, allowing them to better understand the multi-period, but finite, nature of the income stream generated by the asset. Our study builds on the previous experimental work of Porter and Smith [1995] and Noussair and Tucker [2006] .
We find that one futures market, for contracts maturing in the last period of the life of the asset, reduces mispricing among a population prone to bubbles, while having no effect on mispricing in a group not prone to them. It results in an overall improvement in the effectiveness of the price discovery process.
We observe that the average (E)CRT score in a cohort, a statistic measuring the ability/willingness to reflect on a logical problem of members of a group, is significantly negatively correlated with bubbles in baseline sessions without a futures market. In the presence of a futures market, subjects seem to recruit different trading strategies. A higher individ-ual (E)CRT is associated with greater trading profit in the futures market, greater overall earnings, and fewer purchases in the futures market (such purchases are typically unprofitable). The enhanced CRT (ECRT) measure introduced in this paper seems to correlate with outcomes more strongly than the traditional CRT index, and higher ECRT scores at the individual level are strongly associated with greater earnings.
Appendix A: instructions for Futures Treatment
Instructions for experiment
A1. General Instructions
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision-making. The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. The experiment will consist of fifteen trading periods in which you will have the opportunity to buy and sell in a market. The currency used in the market is francs. All trading and earnings will be in terms of francs.
460 francs = 1 euro Your francs will be converted to euro at this rate, and you will be paid in euro by bank transfer after the experiment. The more francs you earn, the more euro you earn.
In each period, you may buy and sell units of a good called X in the Spot Market. X can be considered as an asset with a life of 15 periods, and your inventory of X carries over from one trading period to the next. Each unit of X in your inventory at the end of each trading period pays a dividend to you. The dividend paid on each unit is the same for every participant.
You will not know the exact value of the dividend per unit until the end of each trading period. The dividend is determined by chance at the end of each period by a random number generator. The dividend in each period has an equally likely chance of being 0, 8, 28, or 60. The information is provided in the table below.
The average dividend per period for each unit of X is 24 francs.
The dividend draws in each period are independent. That means that the likelihood of a particular dividend in a period is not affected by the dividend in previous periods.
A2. Your Earnings
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be given 3,600 francs in your Actual Cash inventory. Your earnings for the entire experiment are equal to your Actual Cash inventory at the end of period 15.
All dividends you receive are added to your Actual Cash inventory.
All money spent on purchases is subtracted from your Actual Cash inventory.
All money received from sales is added to your Actual Cash inventory.
Example of earnings from dividends: if you have 6 units of X at the end of period 3 and the dividend draw is 8 francs (which has a 25% chance of occurring), then your dividend earnings for period 3 are equal to 6 units x 8 francs = 48 francs.
A3. Average Value Holding Table
You can use your AVERAGE HOLDING VALUE TABLE (attached at the end of this document) to help you make decisions. It calculates the average amount of dividends you will receive if you keep a unit of X until the end of the experiment. It also describes how to calculate how much in future dividends you give up on average when you sell a share at any time. The following describes each of the columns in the table.
1. Ending Period: period 15 is the last trading period within the experiment, and thus the last period for which to receive a dividend payment. After the final dividend payment in period 15, each unit of X is worthless.
2. Current Period: the period during which the average holding value is being calculated. For example, in period 1, the numbers in the row corresponding to "Current Period 1" are in effect.
3. Number of Remaining Dividend Payments: the number of times that a dividend can be received from the current period until the final period (period 15). That is, it indicates the number of random asset payment draws remaining in the lifetime of the asset. It is calculated by taking the total number of periods, 15, subtracting the current period number, and adding 1, because the dividend is also paid in the current period. Please have a look at the table now and make sure you understand it. The following example may help in your understanding.
Suppose for example that there are 7 periods remaining. Since the dividend paid on a unit of X has a 25% chance of being 0, a 25% chance of being 8, a 25% chance of being 28, and a 25% chance of being 60 in any period, the dividend is on average 24 per period for each unit of X. If you hold a unit of X for 7 periods, the total dividend paid on the unit over the 7 periods is on average 7*24 = 168. 
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